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Abstract
In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of
talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world
economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to
production can be measured accurately and another in which workers engage in
joint production. When individuals have private information about their own
talents, the most able workers self-select into the occupation in which their reward
best reflects their own performance. I describe an equilibrium in which the
country with a more heterogeneous labor force exports the good that is produced
by the most talented individuals. In this country, trade exacerbates the
"polarization" of labor and often worsens the distribution of income. 
JEL Classification: F11, D51.
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Workers diﬀer in ability. Those who are endowed with great intelligence, good health,
and ample energy, and those who have had the beneﬁt of a supportive upbringing
and a quality education, are potentially more productive in a wide range of activities
than others who have been less fortunate along some or all of these dimensions. One
of the most important functions of the labor market is to allocate the heterogenous
pool of talent to the diﬀerent sectors of the economy.
In a world of perfect labor contracts (and competitive ﬁrms, complete markets,
etc.), the allocation of talent would be eﬃcient. A worker of given talents, con-
fronting a range of opportunities to work in diﬀerent sectors, would choose the job
that appealed the most. But the ‘invisible hand’ would guide these choices. The
most talented individuals would be led by market forces to undertake those jobs with
the greatest social return to talent. And individuals of similar ability would ﬁnd
incentive to toil together whenever complementarities in the production technology
dictated the eﬃcacy of their doing so.
Alas, real world labor contracts are rarely perfect. Imperfections arise from in-
formational asymmetries and the costliness of verifying the contingencies that might
appear in a contract. A workers often has better information than prospective em-
ployers about the factors that determine his own productivity. When prospective
employers do not observe all of the relevant aspects of an applicant’s ability, an oﬀer
cannot be made fully contingent on ability. A ﬁrm might wish, then, to link an em-
ployee’s compensation to his or her performance. But there are at least two potential
problems with this. First, an individual’s productivity may be diﬃcult to measure,
because the technology may require joint inputs from a number of workers. Then a
contract could tie payments only to the performance of his team. Second, even this
more limited class of contracts may be restricted, if workers cannot readily observe a
ﬁrm’s output or its proﬁts. Piecework and proﬁt-sharing arrangements break down
when workers cannot verify employers’ claims about joint production or the result-
ing proﬁts. Firms may be left with little choice but to pay similar compensation to
1workers whose talents diﬀer.
If labor contracts cannot ﬁnely distinguish between workers, the allocation of
talent may be distorted. To break even, a ﬁrm must pay a wage commensurate with
the average productivity of its work force. But such an oﬀer induces adverse selection.
A uniform contract that suits the average worker will not appeal to one who knows
himself to be more productive than average and perceives alternative options that
would provide him a greater return on his talent. Firms that are forced to oﬀer
uniform contracts will draw disproportionately from the bottom end of the target
population of workers (i.e., those with the observable attributes it demands), while
the cream of any group of outwardly similar workers will seek activities in which their
outputs can be measured or where they themselves retain property rights to the fruits
of their labor.
Imperfect employment contracting aﬀects both occupational choice and industry
allocation. A talented individual will eschew activities in which individual attribu-
tion is diﬃcult and veriﬁcation of group output is costly. Within an industry, such an
individual might prefer specialties that permit measurement of his personal contri-
bution, or, as in the model presented below, occupations that make him the residual
claimant on the output produced by a number of workers. And since industries dif-
fer in their technologies, the problems posed by imperfect contracting may be more
severe in some sectors than in others. In particular, large-scale manufacturing may
be at a disadvantage in attracting the most talented individuals as compared to,
say, the software, ﬁnancial or legal sectors, where it may be easier to measure the
contributions of individual workers.
In a world of imperfect labor contracts, national diﬀerences in the distribution
of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. Two countries
that are otherwise identical may specialize in diﬀerent activities in a competitive,
free-trade equilibrium, if one country has a greater proportion of low-ability workers
than the other. Consider, for example, the United States and Japan. It is commonly
observed that Japan has a more homogeneous labor force than the United States.
2Suppose the average ability of workers in both countries is the same, and that both
countries have access to the same production technologies. Let there be two sectors,
one (automobiles) in which a worker’s productivity cannot easily be monitored and
a second (software) in which attribution is more readily achieved. In Section 2, I
show that there will be no trade between these countries if employment contracts can
be written that make a worker’s pay contingent on his productivity. In other words,
diﬀerences in the distribution of talent do not generate comparative advantage when
perfect contracts are feasible.1 But suppose that workers’ abilities are not observable
to ﬁrms and that ﬁrms’ outputs are not veriﬁable by employees. Then contracts
cannot tie pay to performance. In the United States, a moderately talented individual
might be disinclined to enter the industry with team production, because average
productivity would be dragged down by those with very low ability. In Japan, the
same forces are present, but to a lesser extent. An individual with the same moderate
talents might be willing to work in a car plant, if the (average) wage paid to all workers
in the sector were not too low. In Section 5, I show that, at a given price, a high-
ability worker may have a greater incentive to join the industry in which his own
output is measurable in a country with a large share of low-ability workers than in
a country with a smaller share of such workers. Such diﬀerences in the incentives
for occupational choice create an opportunity for trade. In particular, when there
is a uniform distribution of talent in each country, the country that has the greater
spread of talent exports the products of attributable eﬀorts and imports the goods
that are jointly produced.
There are some important consequences of the trade that derives from diﬀerences
in distributions of talent in the face of imperfect labor contracting. First, such trade
causes a deterioration of the income distribution in the country that imports the
jointly-produced good. On the margin, an increase in the relative price of software
1Grossman and Maggi (2000) show that diﬀerences in diversity can be a source of international
trade even with perfect information or perfect contracts if, for technological reasons, the talents of
team workers are are substitutable in some sectors and complementary in others. This is discussed
further in Section 5 below.
3induces the most talented workers in the automobile sector to leave that industry
and instead produce software. But this degrades the talent pool among those who
remain in the import-competing sector, which depresses average productivity and
wages there.
Second, trade associated with imperfect labor contracting can exacerbate a pre-
existing production distortion in the country that imports the good produced by
teams. A talented individual choosing between the automobile and software indus-
tries does not take into account that his employment would generate external beneﬁts
in the former sector, but not in the latter. If he opts to work in the sector with joint
production, average productivity there rises and, as we shall see, some of the beneﬁts
accrue to individuals besides himself. If he decides to work instead in the sector in
which his personal productivity is measurable, the individual captures all of the so-
cial returns to his talent. Thus, national income would be augmented by a marginal
increase in the number of individuals who choose the industry with team production,
starting from the competitive equilibrium. Since trade may encourage further special-
ization in individualistic production in the country with a more diverse talent pool, it
has the potential to reduce national income even as it worsens the distribution of that
income. Production subsidies (or tariﬀs) could reverse these eﬀects, although Pareto
improvements are diﬃcult to come by in view of the asymmetries of information that
eliminate the possibility of targeted lump-sum compensations.
The remainder of the paper is in six sections. The basic model is developed in
Section 2. It has two sectors, one in which output is produced by teams and another
in which either individual productivity can be monitored or individuals can work
alone. Labor is the sole input to production, but the labor force is heterogeneous. I
examine the Walrasian equilibrium with perfect labor contracts, which then serves as
a benchmark for what follows. In Sections 3, I characterize the equilibrium occupa-
tional choices in a small, price-taking country with imperfect labor contracts. Section
4 explores the links between relative prices, occupational choice, and income distribu-
tion. I also establish there the ineﬃciency of the competitive equilibrium and discuss
4the policy implications of this. Trade patterns are the subject of Section 5, where I
consider trade between two large countries that diﬀer only in their distributions of
talent. Speciﬁcally, I assume that talent is uniformly distributed with the same mean
in each of two countries and show that the country with the greater spread of talent
imports the good produced by teams. In Section 6, I discuss the relationship of this
paper to some others in the literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy has two sectors. In one sector, production is a collective enterprise.
A team of workers performs a set of indivisible tasks, with one worker needed for
each task. The technology dictates the total number of tasks and thus the size
of a production unit. Output generated by a team is F(q1,q 2,...,q n), where n is
the number of tasks and qi is the skill of the team member who performs task i.
The physical quantity of output may vary with the composition of a team or the
quality of the product may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent teams, with F (·)m e a s u r i n g
output in quality-adjusted units. In any event, there are no identiﬁable outputs of
the individual contributors, only the joint product of the team. I will refer to this as
the “automobile” industry.
In the other sector, individuals can work alone. This may mean that a worker can
produce a ﬁnished good or service single-handedly, as when a particular investment
adviser handles a client’s account, or that an individual’s contribution to a group eﬀort
can be identiﬁed separately, as when some person can take credit for the authorship
of a particular piece of software. The important assumption is that each worker’s
output is measurable and veriﬁable, so that in principle he could operate on his own.
I call this the “software” sector.2
2The designations should not be taken too literally. Although many software ﬁrms are small,
with one or a few individuals writing specialized code, Microsoft has become a massive company
with many team projects. Also, I take liberties in assuming the pervasiveness of synergies in one
sector and their complete absence in the other. In reality, some synergies exist between workers in
5Both technologies have constant returns to talent. Thus, the potential output of
software by an individual of ability qj is λqj. Viewed alone, this statement is nothing
more than a deﬁnition of a unit of talent. But then the operative assumption is
that F(·) is homogeneous of degree one when talent is measured in this way. Rosen
(1981) and Murphy et al. (1991) have emphasized that “superstars” will be drawn
to activities with increasing returns to talent. I do not deny that returns to talent
may vary for diﬀerent activities, or that such considerations may have important
implications for the allocation of talent. But there is no ap r i o r ireason to associate
joint production with decreasing returns to talent, when the abilities of all members
of the team are increased together. Accordingly, I make the more neutral assumption
that output varies with skill similarly in the two sectors.
I also assume that F (·) is symmetric and set the number of tasks equal to two.
The qualitative properties of the model with two members per team are the same as
those with larger teams, so there is no need to carry around the extra terms. As for
symmetry, it seems obvious that, in fact, skill is more important for some tasks than
for others, and that some individuals are especially well suited to perform certain jobs.
But the symmetry assumption allows me to focus on issues to do with imperfect con-
tracting without confounding them with considerations of comparative advantage.3
In this model, a worker of given talents would be equally adept at performing all jobs
in a world of perfect information. All of the predictions about occupational choice
stem from the assumed informational asymmetries and the restrictions on feasible
contracts.
Finally, I take F(q1,q 2) to be a non-decreasing, twice diﬀerentiable, and super-
modular function of its two arguments, with an elasticity of substitution between
talents that is everywhere less than or equal to one.4 Supermodularity means that
for any four workers, aggregate output is highest when the more able of the two work-
most productive ventures.
3See Mussa (1982), Ruﬃn (1988), and Matsuyama (1992) for trade models in which workers
diﬀer in their relative ability to supply labor to diﬀerent sectors.
4This last assumption requires FF12/F1F2 ≥ 1 for all q1 and q2.
6ers performing task 1 is teamed with the more able of the workers performing task
2, as compared to the alternative possible pairing (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
Together with the symmetry of tasks, it implies that it is eﬃcient to pair the two
workers of highest ability and the two of lowest ability, for any conceivable foursome
working in the automobile industry. With F(·)t w i c ed i ﬀerentiable, the supermod-
ularity assumption is equivalent to F12 ≥ 0. Thus, it captures the idea that team
members’ talents are complementary in producing value. Further, the bound on the
elasticity of substitution ensures that the complementarities are moderately strong.
When the elasticity of substitution is never greater than one, both tasks must be
completed at a non-zero level of competence for output to be positive. This seems a
reasonable restriction to place on what one might call ‘team production.’
The labor force comprises a continuum of individuals. Each individual is endowed
with enough time to perform one productive task, be it one of the tasks needed to
produce an automobile or the solo task of writing software. The individuals have no
other valuable uses for their time. It takes no time, however, to oﬀer contracts, sell
output, or pay wages. Therefore, the same individuals who serve as workers conceiv-
ably can own and operate ﬁrms. The owner of a ﬁrm must honor all employment
contracts into which he enters. In return, the owner gains property rights to the
ﬁrm’s output. There is a continuum of ﬁrms in each industry, and all ﬁrm owners
behave competitively in the (world) product market.
The distribution of talent is exogenous in the model. I denote by Φ(q) the fraction
of the L individuals in the home country with ability less than or equal to q.T h e
distribution has a median qmed,am e a n¯ q, and a range from qmin to qmax.W h e n
there are two countries, Φ∗(q) will be used to represent the cumulative distribution
function in the foreign country, and L∗ the labor force there. Often, I will take the
distributions to be continuous and diﬀerentiable. Then φ(q)a n dφ∗(q)w i l ld e n o t e
the derivatives, that is the p.d.f.’s for talent in each country.
I assume that all individuals in both countries have identical and homothetic
preferences. These are represented by the utility function U (ca,c s), where ci is con-
7sumption of good i, for i = a (automobiles) and s (software). I also assume for
expositional simplicity that individuals are risk neutral, so that U (·) is homogeneous
of degree one. Nothing of importance hinges on this assumption.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the equilibrium that would emerge
in a world of perfect information. If individuals could readily observe one another’s
ability, then employers could link compensation to an employee’s talent level. In
such a setting, there would exist separate markets for workers of each ability and a
diﬀerent market clearing wage for each level of talent level. Such a setting admits a
competitive, Walrasian equilibrium, the properties of which are well known.
In a Walrasian equilibrium, resource allocation maximizes the value of aggregate
output given prices. The maximization of value in turn demands productive eﬃciency.
Here, eﬃciency requires positive assortative matching in the automobile industry.5
The equilibrium wages must be such as to make employers of automobile workers
indiﬀerent between the various teams they might assemble, but all teams will comprise
two workers of identical ability. Of course, in equilibrium, there is free entry of
employers, so ﬁrm owners earn zero proﬁts.
Let f ≡ F(1,1)/2. Then, since F(·) has constant returns to talent, 2fq is the
potential output of automobiles by a pair of workers of talent q.T h es a m et w ow o r k e r s
could instead produce 2λq units of software. With eﬃcient matching, a worker’s
productivity is proportional to his talent, regardless of the sector of his employment.
This means that each country has a linear production possibility frontier with a slope
of −f/λ.
In the Walrasian equilibrium, the allocation of talent is indeterminate. So too is
the ownership of ﬁrms. The market clearing contracts pay wages that are proportional
to ability. A worker of ability q can earn λpq by taking a job in the software industry
and fq for one in the automobile industry, where p is the relative price of software in
terms of autos. As in any Ricardian setting, the equilibrium price must be p = f/λ
for positive output of both goods. Then each worker is indiﬀerent as to his sector
5This follows directly from the deﬁnition of supermodularity and the symmetry assumption; see
Kremer (1993) or Grossman and Maggi (2000).
8of employment. Automobile ﬁrms may be owned by one of the team members, who
pays fq to his partner. Or the ﬁrm may be owned by a third party, who pays fq to
each member of the team. In either case, proﬁts are nil. Of course, market forces do
determine the aggregate allocation of talent to each sector, which must be such that
product markets clear.
What about international trade? With perfect information, the model gives rise
to a Ricardian trade equilibrium for countries that share identical technologies. Each
country has a production possibility frontier with slope −f/λ and the same relative
demands for the two goods. Consequently, the benchmark equilibrium has no trade.
3 Imperfect Labor Contracts
Now suppose that an individual’s ability is not observable and that a team’s output
cannot be veriﬁed. For example, it may be diﬃcult for a court to assess the quality
of an automobile or to ascertain which cars were produced by a given team. Then
contracts linking pay to productivity would be impossible to enforce.6 Potential
employers have no choice but to oﬀer contracts with ﬁxed wages. These contracts
are imperfect here, because they cannot be used to generate the eﬃcient matches in
the automobile industry. In this section, I characterize the general equilibrium for a
small country that takes world prices as given.
It is necessary ﬁrst to specify the details of how the labor market with imperfect
contracting operates. I model this market as a two-stage, industry-choice-cum-auction
6In Grossman (1998) I examine an intermediate situation in which workers’ talents are not ob-
servable, but workers can monitor and verify the (quality-adjusted) output of any team. When
output is veriﬁable, employers can write contracts based on team producitivity. I show that, with
no other sources of uncertainty or incomplete information, such contracts are enough to induce
the eﬃcient matches. Thus, performance-based contracts yield a competitive equilibrium with an
eﬃcient allocation of talent and no trade. However, this result is not robust to the introduction
of uncertainty in the production process, if workers are risk averse. One could study the imper-
fect performance-based contracts that arise when output is veriﬁable but production processes are
uncertain and workers are risk averse; here, instead, I assume that output cannot be veriﬁed.
9game. In the ﬁrst stage, each individual makes an irrevocable choice of industry. Let
Ls denote the measure of individuals that elect to produce software; I take some lit-
erary license in calling them “entrepreneurs.” The remaining La = L−Ls individuals
enter a hiring hall, where teams for producing automobiles are formed. In the hiring
hall, each individual submits a bid for a partner. Bids take the form of unconditional
wage oﬀers. The highest ﬁfty percent of the bids are designated as “winners,” the
rest as “losers.” A winning bidder becomes a ﬁrm owner; i.e., he becomes a residual
claimant with property rights to the output of his team. Each such ﬁrm owner is
committed to pay his partner the amount of his bid. With some abuse of terminol-
ogy, I will refer to the winning bidders as the “managers” of the ﬁrms. The losing
bidders are assigned randomly to ﬁrms. These employees, or “workers,” earn a ﬁxed
wage for their eﬀorts.7
In the equilibrium with imperfect contracts, individuals sort themselves by talent
level into the diﬀerent industries and roles. The basis for this sorting is illustrated
in Figure 1, which plots income as a function of ability level for the three diﬀerent
options open to any individual.
In the ﬁgure, the curve WW shows what an individual of talent q can earn if
he elects to enter the automobile industry with the expectation of being hired as
a worker there. The height of the horizontal line reﬂects the collective choices of
all members of the labor force. But, no matter what choices are made and what
equilibrium wage rate w results, the option to become a worker aﬀords any individual
the opportunity to earn a ﬁxed income that is independent of his talent level.
7Notice that the owner of each ﬁrm is a member of the production team. I have speciﬁed the
auction process so that this must be true, but there are also good economic reasons for it. If a
third-party owner were to bid for two employees, such an individual would not know the ability of
either one. Such a potential owner would face an informational disadvantage relative to the worker-
owners, who at least know their own ability. It will turn out that, at the prevailing equilibrium
wage, any third-party owner of an automobile ﬁrm who might contemplate submitting a (winning)
bid for a pair of employees would face an expected shortfall of revenues relative to costs. Thus, the
model provides an endogenous motive for “inside ownership,” with some team members becoming










Figure 1: Occupational Choice
The curve MM shows the expected income available to one who enters the auto-
mobile industry with the intention of becoming a manager. Such a manager faces
uncertain prospects, because he commits to pay a ﬁxed wage while his gross earnings
depend on the identity of the partner with whom he is matched. But for any pool
of potential employees, a prospective manager can compute the expected output of a
team on which he might participate. Expected income is just the diﬀerence between
expected output and the promised wage. The expected income of an individual qua
manager is an increasing function of ability, because managers themselves perform
one of the tasks required for joint production. Potential income decreases with w,
because the manager must pay this amount to his prospective employee. Finally,
the expected income of a manager reﬂects all of the occupational choices, inasmuch
as these choices determine the composition of the labor pool from which the manager
draws his partner.
Finally, the curve EE depicts the income opportunity for one who elects to become
11an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur produces a quantity of software in direct proportion
to his talent level. Therefore, the potential income from this occupation is a linear
function of ability, and reﬂects as well the world relative price p of software.
In the ﬁgure, I have depicted the MM curve as a concave function of an individ-
ual’s ability. This must be true for all possible combinations of occupational choices,
because for any given pool of potential workers, the expected output of a manager
and his randomly assigned partner is a concave function of the manager’s own talent
level. I have also drawn the MM curve as passing above the (unique) intersection of
the WW and EE curves. I will later argue (mostly in Appendix A) that this must
be true in any equilibrium in which both goods are produced. It follows that there is
a similar sorting of talent in any equilibrium with incomplete specialization. In such
an equilibrium, individuals with talent below some cut-oﬀ level qw opt to become
workers and earn a ﬁxed wage. Those with talent levels between qw and qm choose to
be managers in the automobile sector. And the most able individuals — those with
talent levels above qm — produce software, where their personal productivity is fully
reﬂe c t e di nt h e i re a r n i n g s .
When talent is sorted in the manner described, an individual with ability qw must
be indiﬀerent in equilibrium between becoming a worker and becoming a manager.
As a worker, he would earn a wage w. As a manager, he would draw a random
partner from among all those in the pool of employees; i.e., those with a talent level
less than or equal to his own. Each manager pays his employee a wage w. Therefore,






F(qw,q)dΦ(q) − w.( 1 )
Similarly, an individual with talent qm must face similar earnings prospects as a
manager and as an entrepreneur. In the former occupation, he draws from the same
pool of potential partners as do other managers. As an entrepreneur, he stands to
earn λpqm from his potential output of λqm units of software. Thus, in an equilibrium






F(qm,q)dΦ(q) − w.( 2 )
Finally, the number of workers in the automobile sector must match the number of
managers, since each team comprises one worker and one manager. The number of
workers is Φ(qw) when all those with talent levels between qmin and qw select this
occupation. The number of managers is Φ(qm) − Φ(qw) when those with abilities
between qw and qm opt for management positions. Thus,
Φ(qw)=Φ(qm) − Φ(qw)( 3 )
in any equilibrium.
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are three equations for the variables qw, qm,a n dw,
parameterized by p. When they have a solution with qmax >q m >q w >q min and
w ≥ 0, they describe an equilibrium in a small economy that faces the relative price p.
The equilibrium is supported by the following bidding strategies for those who enter
the hiring hall in the automobile sector. Suppose there is a measure La of individuals
in the hall and let ˜ q(La) denote the median talent level among the La least talented
members of the labor force. Each individual in the hall with talent above ˜ q(La)b i d s
the wage that would make an individual with talent ˜ q(La) indiﬀerent between being
an employer and an employee. Each person with talent below ˜ q(La)b i d st h ew a g et h a t
leaves him personally indiﬀerent between working as an employee or hiring a random
partner from the suspected employee pool at that wage. With these strategies, when
the hiring hall does indeed attract the La least talented individuals in the economy, no
one in the hall has any incentive to deviate. The more talented half are the winning
bidders. Each manager pays just what is needed to hire an employee, but nothing
more. A higher bid would only serve to raise his wage bill (since he is anyway a
winner, and the set of losers would not change), while a lower bid would drop him
from the winning set. Since the designated winning bidders have talent at least as
great as the suspected median in the group, each strictly prefers to hire another at
the speciﬁed wage than to be hired himself. As for the losing bidders, they cannot
13beneﬁt by bidding more (since they have bid their reservation wages), nor do they
have any reason to bid less.8
To ensure that a solution to equations (1) - (3), when it exists, characterizes
an equilibrium for the small open economy, we need to verify that each individual
(weakly) prefers his designated occupation to every alternative. Clearly, this is so
when the WW, MM,a n dEE curves are aligned as in Figure 1. So, what we need to
check is that the MM curve passes above the intersection of the WW curve and the
EE curve, as was previously presumed. If it does not, then a group of individuals with
talent just greater than that of the workers could earn more as entrepreneurs in the
software industry than as managers of automobile plants. But this would contradict
my supposition about the equilibrium sorting of talent. However, I prove in Appendix
A that there can be no equilibrium in which some individuals who opt to work in
the software industry have less ability than others who choose to manage automobile
plants. The proof makes use of the assumption that the elasticity of substitution
between talents in the production function for automobiles is everywhere less than
or equal to one. This assumption is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to rule out an
equilibrium conﬁguration in which the MM curve passes below the intersection of
the WW curve and the EE curve.
A solution to (1) - (3) with qmax >q m >q w >q min and w ≥ 0 exists if and only if
8Notice that no third party would wish to hire a pair of workers for the amount of the winning
bids, because the expected productivity of two random hires from among a worker pool comprising
the least talented La/2 workers is less than twice the wage that would leave the median in the group
indiﬀerent between serving as a worker or as a manager.














and qmed is the median talent level in the labor force. Thus, pa and ps are the
limits on the relative price of software that allow for an equilibrium with incomplete
specialization. When p<p a, the most talented individual in the labor force earns
more by hiring a random partner from among those in the bottom half of the talent
distribution than he could by producing software.10 Then the economy specializes
in the production of automobiles. When p>p s, the least talented worker can earn
more by producing software than he can earn by entering the automobile sector and
matching with another whose talent is exactly like his own.11 Then the economy
specializes in producing software.
Finally, we observe that the solution to (1) - (3) need not be unique. That is, for
a general distribution function Φ(q) and an arbitrary relative price p,t h e r em a yb e
s e v e r a l( b u ta l w a y sa no d dn u m b e ro f)d i ﬀerent allocations of talent with the property















2F(qmax,q max)dΦ(q), so ps >p a if and only if
R qmed
qmin I(q)dΦ(q) > 0, where
I(q) ≡ 1
2F(qmax,q max)+1
2F(qmed,q) − F(qmax,q). Now, I(qmed) > 0 by the supermodularity of F,
and I0(q)=1
2F2(qmed,q) − F2(qmax,q) < 0. Therefore
R qmed
qmin I(q)dΦ(q) > 0, which implies ps >p a.
10The expected output of a manager with abiltiy qmax who hires randomly from among those in
the bottom half of the talent distribution is 2
R qmed
qmin F(qmax,q)dΦ(q). This provides the manager
with a higher expected income in the autombile sector than the amount λpqmax that he could earn
as an entrepreneur, in view of p>p a and w =
R qmed
qmin F(qmed,q)dΦ(q). This value for w is implied
by the condition of indiﬀerence for the marginal worker.
11Two individuals of talent level qmin who pair in the automobile sector as manager and worker
will each earn fqmin.T h i si sl e s st h a nλpqmin when p>p s.
15that no individual has an incentive to make a diﬀerent choice of occupation or bid
diﬀerently in the hiring hall, given the anticipated behavior of others. For each such








and xs = λL
R qmax
qm qdΦ(q) that determine, together with aggregate demand, the pat-
tern of world trade.
4 Consequences of International Trade
In the ﬁrst part of this section, I study the consequences of international trade in a
small country. I do so by examining the relationship between relative prices and the
expected income of individuals at all levels in the talent distribution. In the second
part of the section, I investigate the normative properties of the free-trade equilibrium.
I show that the equilibrium marginal rate of transformation between software and
automobiles falls short of the world relative price of software. It follows that a
small subsidy to automobile production would boost the value of national income at
international prices even as it would improve the distribution of that income.
4.1 Exogenous changes in relative price
Consider the eﬀects of an increase in p, as for example when the terms of trade
improve in a country that exports software. Figure 2 proves useful for this purpose.
In this ﬁgure, the curve AA (“A” for automobile) depicts combinations of qm and w
that satisfy (1) and (3) for a given price p between pa and ps. Along this curve, when
all individuals with ability less than or equal to qm work in the automobile sector and
the most talented half of them are managers, the individual with talent qw is just
indiﬀerent between being a worker and being a manager. The curve slopes upward,
because the greater is the wage, the more tempting it is to be a worker, and only an
individual of greater ability choosing from a more talented employment pool would
be indiﬀerent between the two roles. The curve SS (“S” for software) in turn depicts















Figure 2: Change in Relative Price
17manager indiﬀerent between entering the software and automobile industries after
taking into account who would be in the automobile employment pool at the given
qm. This curve can slope in either direction, and can be steeper or ﬂatter than the
AA curve when it is upward sloping. To see this, note that expected income rises
with ability in both sectors. In the software industry, expected income rises exactly in
proportion to talent. But in the automobile industry, expected income may rise more
than or less than in proportion to the talent of the best manager, once the associated
change in the employment pool is taken into account. If the best manager’s expected
income from running an automobile ﬁrm rises less than in proportion to talent after
accounting for the change in qw, then a new marginal manager with greater talent
can be indiﬀerent between industries only if the wage is lower. This gives a downward
sloping SS curve, as depicted in panel a.I f ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i n c o m ef o rt h em o s t
talented manager in the automobile sector rises more than in proportion to qm after
qw adjusts, then the SS curve slopes upward. The curve must lie above the AA curve
at qm = qmin and it must lie below it at qm = qmax, but, in principle, it can cross the
AA curve several times.12 Multiple crossings, such as are depicted in panel b, indicate
the existence of multiple equilibria, a possibility that was mentioned in the previous
section. An increase in the price of software makes employment in the software sector
more attractive. An individual with some given talent who was indiﬀerent between
managing an automobile plant and producing software before the price change will
only be indiﬀerent afterwards if the cost of hiring an employee in the automobile
sector is lower than before. Thus, the SS curve shifts downward, as indicated by the
dotted curves in the two panels of Figure 2. Meanwhile, the price hike leaves the AA
curve unaﬀected.
When the equilibrium is unique, an increase in the price of software causes qm to
fall. This is clear in panel a, which depicts a falling SS curve, and it also applies to
12The fact that p>p a ensures SS above AA at qm = qmin. Similarly, p<p s ensures AAabove
SS at qm = qmax.
18t h ec a s eo far i s i n gSS curve that cuts the AA curve once from below.13 Intuitively,
an increase in p draws individuals into the software sector by improving the prospects
there for those who might otherwise operate automobile ﬁrms. As the top managers
leave the automobile industry, some who were workers must now operate their own
ﬁrms. That is, qw falls, and with it the average talent of those remaining in the
employment pool. The wage rate is equal to one-half the expected output of the
least-talented manager and his random partner (see (1)). Since both qw and the
average ability of the partner fall, the wage falls as well.
Figure 3 depicts two possible shifts in the talent-income proﬁl e .I nb o t hc a s e s ,t h e
rich get richer, while the poor get poorer! The most talented individuals – those who
toiled in the software industry in the original equilibrium – surely beneﬁtf r o ma n y
increase in the relative price of software. Their nominal incomes rise in proportion
to p, which means that their real incomes rise no matter what they consume. And
the least talented individuals – those who are employees in automobile ﬁrms in the
ﬁnal equilibrium – surely lose. For these individuals, nominal incomes fall even as
consumer prices rise. In panel a,t h er i s ei np h u r t sa l lt h o s ew h or e m a i ni nt h e
automobile sector after the change in relative price. Here the beneﬁts of the terms of
trade improvement go only to the society’s elite. Panel b shows the possibility that
a group of relatively low-ability managers in the automobile industry might beneﬁt
from a rise in p. For these individuals, the cost savings from the drop in wages might
outweigh the (expected) loss of productivity from the degradation of the employment
pool.14
Panel b of Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of an increase in the price of software when
there are multiple equilibria. Starting from any equilibrium at which the SS curve
13If the curves cross only once, the SS curve must be ﬂatter than the AA c u r v ea tt h ep o i n to f
intersection, by the argument of the previous footnote.
14Note that the decline in the wage beneﬁts all managers of automobile ﬁrms equally, whereas the
degredation of the talent pool hurts most the managers with the greatest talent. Therefore, it is the









Figure 3: Relative Price and Income Distribution
20cuts the AA curve from below, the comparative statics are qualitatively like the ones
I have just described; employment in the software sector expands, output of software
rises, and the wage rate falls. All of these responses are reversed when the AA curve
is steeper than the SScurve at the initial equilibrium. It is worth noting, however,
that such equilibria are unstable for an ad hoc adjustment process under which the
wage rises when the median individual in the automobile industry earns more as a
worker than as a manager (given qm) and the automobile sector contracts when the
most talented manager could earn more in that sector than he could by hiring an
employee, given w.
4.2 Ineﬃciency of the free-trade equilibrium
I will now argue that a subsidy to automobile producers would expand the size of
the economic pie even as it redistributes income from those who earn the most to
those who earn the least.15 In other words, the size of the software sector in the free-
trade equilibrium is larger than that which maximizes the value of national output
at international prices.
The argument is straightforward. At the free-trade equilibrium, the least talented
software writer produces output worth λpqm. If he were to choose instead to enter the
automobile industry, his marginal contribution to national income would be π(qm)+













But π(qm)=λpqm, since the marginal manager must be indiﬀerent between the
two industries when occupational choices are made to maximize personal income.
National income would be augmented by shifting the marginal software writer to the
15In making this statement, I neglect the possibility that the initial equilibrium is one at which
the AA curve cuts the SS curve from below.







dΦ(z). The marginal contribution to national
income is (dxa/dqm)/φ(qm), which can be calculated directly using dqw/dqm = φ(qm)/2φ(qw).
21automobile industry if and only if Ω > 0. In fact, Ω must be positive, because the
term in brackets is the diﬀerence in expected output when a manager of talent z
teams with the most talented worker compared to when he teams with a randomly
selected worker.
I conclude that, when labor contracts are imperfect, private and social incentives
diverge. When a talented individual enters into team production, he generates a
positive externality. This is because his presence in the industry improves the talent
pool there, which raises the average productivity in ﬁrms other than his own. In
contrast, a talented individual appropriates all of the social beneﬁts when he elects
to work alone. A government could subsidize the sector in which an individual’s
productivity cannot be measured to encourage entry there. Not only would the
poorest members of society beneﬁt, but the increase in income would exceed the cost
of the (small) subsidy.
5 Talent Distribution and the Pattern of Trade
In the last section, I established some properties of a trade equilibrium in a small
country with imperfect labor contracts. This section examines the pattern of trade
between two large countries. More speciﬁcally, I link the trade pattern to diﬀerences
in the distribution of talent. Once that is done, I will be able to discuss how trade
aﬀects income distribution diﬀerently in relatively homogeneous versus relatively het-
erogeneous societies.
I consider the special case in which each country has a uniform distribution of
talent and the mean skill level is the same in both two countries. In the foreign
country, the range of talents is from ¯ q − e∗ to ¯ q + e∗. In the home country, talents
run from ¯ q − e to ¯ q + e,with e>e ∗. Thus, the home country has a more diverse
labor force than the foreign country, and a greater fraction of individuals with very
low ability. We will see how this leads the home country to export software.
In a free-trade equilibrium, the countries face the same relative world price. We







Figure 4: Distribution of Talent and Pattern of Specialization
goods respond to a change in e at a given price p.
To this end, consider Figure 4. The solid lines in the ﬁgure show the determination
of the marginal manager and the wage rate for an initial value of e. The two curves
have the same interpretation as in Figure 2; AA depicts combinations of qm and
w that leave the individual with talent qw indiﬀerent between being a worker and a
manager when half of the individuals in the automobile sector are managers, while SS
shows combinations of qm and w that make the marginal manager indiﬀerent between
entering the two sectors. Recall that the AA curve slopes upward no matter what
the distribution of talent. It is relatively easy to show that the SS curve must slope
downward when talent is uniformly distributed.
A spread in the distribution of talent shifts both curves downward. The new loca-
tions are indicated by the dotted lines. The shift in the AA curve can be understood
as follows. For a given value of qm, an increase in e reduces qw.I fqm were unchanged,
the new least-talented manager would be less productive than before, and, moreover,
he would draw from a less talented pool of workers. For this individual to be attracted
into management, the wage would need to be lower than before. As for the SS curve,
23the reasoning is similar. For an individual with talent qm, expected revenues in the
automobile sector decline with an increase in e, because the average ability of the
prospective partner is lower. The individual who was initially the marginal manager
can be indiﬀe r e n tb e t w e e nt h et w oi n d u s t r i e so n l yi ft h ew a g er a t ea l s oi sl o w e r .
The algebra reveals that the SS curve shifts down by more.17 Thus, an increase in
the uniform spread of talent at a given price causes some individuals who would have
worked in the team sector to opt instead for production where their productivity can
be measured. The downward shift in qm occurs because the fall in the average ability
of a prospective hire outweighs the decline in the wage. This reﬂects the assumed
complementarities in team production. Since the least-talented manager is relatively
close in ability to his expected partner, the downward pressure on the wage caused
by the dilution of the worker pool is modest compared to the loss of productivity for
the most-talented manager, for whom the reduction in a partner’s talent is especially
damaging.
It can be shown, in fact, that dqm/de < −1; i.e., the range of individuals who
choose the automobile sector contracts, even as the number of persons with any given
talent level falls. Thus, there are fewer individuals in the automobile sector after the
mean-preserving spread, and the average ability of both workers and managers is di-
minished. This implies that a uniform spread in talent reduces output of automobiles
at a given price.
In the software sector, the number of writers expands, but average ability falls.
Output would remain the same if dqm/de were equal to minus one. Then the number
of software writers would be unchanged, and the average ability would be the same
as well. Since dqm/de < −1, the sector is even larger than the size that would keep
output constant. Although the extra software writers are less productive than the
others in the industry, they still produce positive output. Therefore, a spread in the
talent distribution increases aggregate software production.
To summarize, the larger pool of very low skilled workers in the country with the
17All of the algebra is relegated to Appendix B.
24greater spread of talents generates a greater disincentive for a talented individual to
enter into team production. Such an individual would anticipate being paired with a
less able partner in the country with the fatter bottom tail in the talent distribution.
Although the wage he would pay his partner would be lower in this country as well,
the loss in expected productivity would outweigh the cost savings. We ﬁnd that the
country with the greater diversity of talents produces relatively fewer automobiles,
and of course relatively more software. With identical and homothetic preferences,
this country imports automobiles and exports software in a free-trade equilibrium.
What are the eﬀects of the trade induced by imperfect labor contracting? Com-
pared to autarky, the relative price of software is higher in the country that exports
software. We have seen that a rise in p raises the income of the most talented (and
richest) individuals, while reducing the wage for those with the least ability. Thus,
trade contributes to a further polarization of society in a country that has a relatively
diverse labor force. Just the opposite is true in the relatively homogeneous society;
the range of incomes was relatively narrow to begin with, and trade narrows this
range even further. Finally, note that trade exacerbates the informational externality
in the country with a greater spread of talents, whereas it alleviates this externality
in its trade partner.
6 Related Literature
Murphy et al. (1991) contains an excellent discussion of the factors that guide the
allocation of talent. In their modeling of occupational choice, these authors follow
Rosen (1981) in emphasizing returns to scale. They point out that the ablest people
tend to choose sectors with large potential markets and weak diminishing returns to
scale. This allows a “superstar” to spread his ability advantage over the largest pos-
sible scale of operations. Murphy et al. present a model, based on Lucas (1978), in
which there is a continuum of individuals with heterogeneous abilities. Each produc-
tion unit has a single manager and an endogenous workforce, where the productivity
of the workforce is proportional to the ability of the manager. In this setting, the
25most talented individuals become managers, because their extra proﬁts from a given
workforce are more than in proportion to their ability advantage, and because the
abler managers can operate larger ﬁrms and so spread their talent over a larger scale.
Murphy et al. certainly recognized the importance of contract considerations in
determining what occupations and sectors would be attractive to talented persons.
In fact, they wrote that
diﬀerences in contracts between industries are probably as important or
more important than diminishing returns to scale [for determining the
allocation of talent]. In industries where it is easy to identify and reward
t a l e n t ,i tm i g h tb ep o s s i b l et op a yt h ea b l ep e o p l et h et r u eq u a s ir e n t s
on their ability and so attract them. ... Starting one’s own company
is obviously the most direct way to capitalize on one’s talent without
sharing the quasi rents. ...Also, talent will ﬂow into sectors with less joint
production, where it is easier to assign credit and reward contributions.
(p.513)
In this paper I have developed a general equilibrium model of occupational choice
in which imperfect contracting governs the choice of job and sector by individuals of
diﬀerent abilities. My model complements that of Lucas (1978) where potential scale
plays the critical role.
The issues to do with adverse selection in my analysis call to mind some of the
literature on eﬃciency wages. In particular, Weiss (1980, 1991) and Malcomson
(1981) present models in which ﬁrms that cannot observe workers’ abilities oﬀer
“extra” wages in order to make their jobs appealing to a wider range of talents.18
The focus of these papers is on the unemployment that could result when all ﬁrms
attempt to pay above-market wages in order to improve their applicant pool. Here,
I have intentionally adopted an institutional setting in which eﬃciency wages are
impossible. First, I have assumed ex post immobility across sectors, which means that
18Theirs are not general equilibrium models of occupational choice in the sense that mine is,
inasmuch as the indentities of the residual are not determined endogenously in the model.
26the population of workers in the automobile industry is ﬁxed at the time that contracts
are tendered. Second, I have modeled the labor market as a multi-winner auction,
which precludes talented managers from oﬀering high wages and thereby attracting
applications from individuals who would otherwise serve as managers themselves. My
intent here was to focus on the allocation of talent in a simple model with imperfect
contracts, not to study the determinants of unemployment. Since perfect matching
could never result even if ﬁrms were to oﬀer eﬃciency wages, it seemed best to abstract
from the complications that such oﬀers introduce.19
My analysis of the trade equilibrium bears a family resemblance to that in Clemenz
(1995). Clemenz studies a two-sector model in which ﬁrms can observe a worker’s
productivity in one sector but not the other. In the sector with unobservable produc-
tivity, ﬁrms pay eﬃciency wages. Those who cannot secure jobs in this sector at the
above-market clearing wage ﬁnd employment ex post in the other sector. Clemenz in-
vestigates the free-trade equilibrium that results when there are two types of workers
in each country. He ﬁnds that the country with the greater proportion of high-ability
individuals has a comparative advantage in the sector where information is imperfect.
He also concludes, like me, that the equilibrium allocation of talent is ineﬃcient, and
that trade can bring harm to one of the countries by causing its sector with unob-
servable productivity to contract.
This paper also relates to previous research on the matching of workers in ﬁrms.
In particular, Kremer (1993) and Legros and Newman (1997) have studied the sorting
generated by a competitive labor market when the production process requires that
several individuals interact and the tasks performed by each are complementary in
producing output. Kremer and Maskin (1996) document the growing segregation
of American workers by skill and the absolute decline in wages of low-skill workers.
They use a model with complementarities between asymmetric tasks to explain these
19In a setting in which talented managers can oﬀer high wages to attract a more talented pool of
applicants, there would still be no way to prevent the less talented from applying for the high-wage
jobs. Thus, perfect matching of individuals of like ability in the automobile industry could not be
an equilibrium outcome.
27observations, which they ascribe ultimately to an increase in both the mean and the
dispersion of talents in the U.S. labor force. My results suggest that growing trade
with countries that have more homogeneous populations than the United States can
account for many of the same observations.
Like in this paper, Grossman and Maggi (2000) draw a link between the diver-
sity of talent in a country’s labor force and the pattern of its international trade.
But they emphasize technological diﬀerences in the interaction between workers in
diﬀerent sectors. In some industries, diﬀerent productive activities may be comple-
mentary, as suggested by Kremer (1993). In other industries, diﬀerent activities may
be substitutable in creating output; for example, value may be very high when one
or a small number of tasks is performed especially well. If this is true, then a country
with a more diverse labor force has a comparative advantage in the sector in which
there is substitutability between tasks. Since substitutability often makes working
alone optimal, the technological explanation of the trade pattern complements the
contracting story oﬀered here.
7 Conclusions
Employment contracts take diﬀerent forms in the diﬀerent sectors of an economy. In
some sectors, individuals can reap enormous gains if their contributions prove highly
valuable. In other sectors, a narrower range of rewards is possible. Often these latter
are the sectors where it is diﬃcult to attribute proﬁts to individuals. Diﬀerences in
contracts play an important and neglected role in the allocation of resources.
In this paper, I have developed a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect
labor contracts. In one sector, teams produce output the value of which cannot be
veriﬁed in court. In the other sector, individuals contributions are readily observable,
or individuals can work alone. The most talented individuals prefer the second type
of industry, because they can capture greater returns to their ability there. This
leaves those with moderate or lesser talents to enter into team production.
When countries diﬀer in the compositions of their labor forces, the pressures for
28this type of segregation by skill vary. The ablest individuals have the greatest in-
centive to separate themselves when the diﬀerence between their own skill and that
of their (outwardly similar) compatriots is substantial. While these incentives are
present even in a relatively homogeneous society, they are less severe there. It follows
that diversity breeds comparative advantage in the face of private information about
ability and imperfect labor contracting. A country with a relatively heterogeneous
labor force will export goods produced by individual (or attributable) eﬀorts and
import those produced by teams. The growing U.S. comparative advantage in ﬁnan-
cial services and software and the continuing decline of its Rust Belt can perhaps be
understood in these terms.
The polarization that accompanies growing trade with more homogeneous soci-
eties has a social cost. As the most able people opt for individualistic activities, the
talent pool available to teams is diminished. This lowers average productivity in the
team sector and drives down wages there. Thus, trade beneﬁts the most talented
individuals in the diverse country at the expense of those who are least well oﬀ.
My analysis has employed a number of simplifying assumptions. In reality, there
are varying degrees of observability of output and proﬁts, and a variety of contract
provisions that tie pay to observable performance measures. For example, executives
in publicly traded ﬁrms often receive stock options as part of their compensation pack-
ages. The value of these options varies automatically with the market’s assessment
of the performance of the ﬁrm, though the options do not reﬂect exactly the exec-
utive’s personal productivity. An interesting extension of this paper would expand
the richness of the contract space to allow ﬁner predictions about the intersectoral
allocation of talent.
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31Appendix A
In this appendix I prove that, for p ∈ (pa,p s), there exists an equilibrium with incomplete specialization
in which every individual in the software sector has greater ability than the most able manager in the
automobile industry. I also prove that there does not exist any equilibrium in which some individuals in
the software industy have less ability than that of the most able manager.
For p>p a,t h eSS curve of Figure 2 lies above the AA curve at qm = qmin.F o rp<p s,t h eAA curve
lies above the SS curve at qm = qmax. Both curves are continuous. Therefore, when p ∈ (pa,p s),t h e
curves must intersect at least once for some qm between qmin and qmax. At this intersection, equations
(1)-(3) are satisﬁed and w>0. To establish the existence of an equilibrium of the sort described in the
text, it remains to verify only that individuals between qw and qm prefer to manage automobile plants
than produce software. To this end, I deﬁne ˜ F(z) ≡ 1
Φ(qw)
R qw
qmin F(z,q)dΦ(q), which is the expected
output of an automobile ﬁrm managed by an individual of ability z w h e nt h ee m p l o y e ep o o lc o n s i s t s
of those whose abililities fall between qmin and qw. Then I need to show that ˜ F(z) − w>λ p zfor all
z ∈ (qw,q m),w h e nw,qw, and qm take on the values associated with the solution to equations (1) - (3).
Suppose not. Then, for the values of w,qw, and qm that satisfy (1) - (3), the conﬁguration of the
WW, MM,a n dEE curves must be as depicted in Figure 5. Deﬁne ˆ q such that λpˆ q = w.N o t i c et h a t
ˆ q<q w, which, with (1), implies ˜ F(qw)/2qw <λ p . Notice too that the slope of the MM curve at qw
exceeds its slope at the (ﬁrst) intersection with EE, which in turn exceeds the slope of EE.T h u s ,








Since F(·) is symmetric and has an elasticity of substitution less than one, qwF1(qw,q)/F(qw,q) ≤ 1/2
















which is a contradition. It follows that, for p ∈ (pa,p s), there exists a solution to (1)-(3) with w>0 and
˜ F(z) − w>λ p zfor all z ∈ (qw,q m).
Now suppose that there exists an equilibrium with incomplete specialization in which some individuals
in the software industry have less ability than that of the most able manager. In such an equilibrium,
the allocation of labor must be as shown in Figure 6. The least talented individuals with q<ˆ q = w/λp
are workers in the automobile industry. Those with q ∈ (ˆ q,qa) work in the software industry, while those
with abilities q ∈ (qa,q b) are managers of automobile ﬁrms.
Deﬁne qw so that ˆ F(qw) − w = w, where ˆ F(z) ≡ 1
Φ(ˆ q)
R ˆ q
qmin F(z,q)dΦ(q) is the expected output of



















qa q ^ qb
Figure 6: Hypothetical Equilibrium with Two Sets of Entrepreneurs
33between qmin and ˆ q.W i t ht h i sd e ﬁnition, qw is at the intersection of MM and WW; therefore qw > ˆ q.
Also, the MM curve is steeper at qw than it is at qa, and it is steeper at qa than is the EE curve.
Therefore, ˆ F0(qw) >λ p .
But qw > ˆ qimplies ˆ F(qw)/2qw <λ p ,b yt h ed e ﬁnitions of qw and ˆ q. Also, the symmetry of F(·) and
the fact that it has an elasticity of substitution everywhere less than one implies qwF1(qw,q)/F(qw,q) ≤

















Again, we have a contradiction. So there can be no equilibrium of the sort depicted in Figure 6.
Appendix B
This appendix derives the comparative statics of the model under the assumption of a uniform distribu-
tion of talents. In the process, I substantiate the various claims made in the text.
Let q ∼ U[qmin,q max],w h e r eqmin =¯ q − e, qmax =¯ q + e,a n d¯ q is the mean of q. Combining (1) and












With q uniformly distributed, (3) becomes
qm =2 qw − qmin . (A2)






















dq − ˜ F(qm)+
˜ F(qw)
2
+ F(qm,q w) − fqw
)
(A4)
and ˜ F(z)= 1
qw−qmin
R qw
qmin F(z,q)dq is the expected output for a manager of ability z.




∆ = − ˜ F(qm)+
3qw − 2qmin
2qw




= ∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3 + ∆4 + ∆5 ,











∆1 ≡ F(qm,q min)+F(qw,q w) − F(qm,q w) − F(qw,q min) ,


















[2F(qw,q min) − F(qw,q w) − F(qmin,q min)] .
Now, ∆1,∆2,a n d∆5 are negative by the supermodularity of F(·), ∆3 is negative because qw ≥ q for all
q ∈ [qmin,q w],a n d∆4 is negative because F12(qw,q) > 0 and F(·) homogeneous of degree one implies
F22(qw,q) < 0 for q ∈ [qmin,q w].T h u s ,∆ < 0.




qm qdq. Therefore, dxs/dp > 0.






Then ∂w/∂qw > 0, which means that dw/dp < 0.












− F(qm,q min) −
F(qw − qmin)
2














































[F(qm,q min) − F(qw,q min)]
¾
. (A5)
Note that −2/∆ > 0, while ∆ < 0 and qm >q w, which implies that the term in curly brackets in (A5)
is negative. Therefore, dqm/de +1< 0 and, af o r t i o r i , dqm/de < 0.
From xs = λL
2e
R qmax














35But qm >q min =¯ q − e implies eqm >e¯ q − e2 and q2




















So dqm/de +1< 0implies dxs/de > 0; i.e., a spread in the distribution of talent increases equilibrium
output of software.





















































With dqm/de < −1, this implies dqm/de < dqw/de < −1.
The term on the ﬁrst line on the right-hand side of (A6) is negative, because qw >q min.T h et e r m
on the second line of (A6) is negative, because F(z,qw) >F (z,qmin) and dqw/de < −1.T h e t e r mo n
the third line of (A6) is negative, because ˜ F(qm) > ˜ F(qw) and dqm/de < dqw/de < 0. I conclude that
dxa/de < 0; i.e., a spread in the distribution of talent reduces equilibrium output of automobiles.
Since dxs/de > 0 and dxa/de < 0, d(xs/xa)/de > 0. That is, a spread in the distribution of talent
increases relative output of software at a given price. It follows that a country with a more diverse
labor force produces relatively more software in a free-trade equilibrium. With identical and homothetic
preferences, this country must export software and import automobiles.
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